on the improvement of the understanding(提高阅读能力)-第5部分
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whereof we shall examine the causes hereafter in our philosophy。 （3）
Moreover； it demands； as we shall show； a keen and accurate discernment。
（4） Lastly； it is hindered by the conditions of human life； which are； as we
have already pointed out； extremely changeable。 （5） There are also other
obstacles； which we will not here inquire into。
＇46＇ （1） If anyone asks why I have not at the starting…point set
forth all the truths of nature in their due order； inasmuch as truth is self…
evident； I reply by warning him not to reject as false any paradoxes he
may find here； but to take the trouble to reflect on the chain of reasoning
by which they are supported； he will then be no longer in doubt that we
have attained to the truth。 （2） This is why I have as above。
＇47＇ （1） If there yet remains some sceptic； who doubts of our primary
truth； and of all deductions we make； taking such truth as our standard； he
must either be arguing in bad faith； or we must confess that there are men
in complete mental blindness either innate or due to misconceptions … that
is； to some external influence。 （2） Such persons are not conscious of
themselves。 （3） If they affirm or doubt anything； they know not that they
affirm or doubt： they say that they know nothing； and they say that they
are ignorant of the very fact of their knowing nothing。 （4） Even this they
do not affirm absolutely； they are afraid of confessing that they exist； so
long as they know nothing； in fact； they ought to remain dumb； for fear of
haply supposing which should smack of truth。
＇48＇ （1） Lastly； with such persons； one should not speak of sciences：
for； in what relates to life and conduct； they are compelled by necessity to
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suppose that they exist； and seek their own advantage； and often affirm
and deny； even with an oath。 （2） If they deny； grant； or gainsay； they
know not that they deny； grant； or gainsay； so that they ought to be
regarded as automata； utterly devoid of intelligence。
＇49＇ （1） Let us now return to our proposition。 （2） Up to the present；
we have； first； defined the end to which we desire to direct all our thoughts；
secondly； we have determined the mode of perception best adapted to aid
us in attaining our perfection； thirdly； we have discovered the way which
our mind should take； in order to make a good beginning … namely； that it
should use every true idea as a standard in pursuing its inquiries according
to fixed rules。 （49：3） Now； in order that it may thus proceed； our method
must furnish us； first； with a means of distinguishing a true idea from all
other perceptions； and enabling the mind to avoid the latter； secondly； with
rules for perceiving unknown things according to the standard of the true
idea； thirdly； with an order which enables us to avoid useless labor。 （49：4）
When we became acquainted with this method； we saw that； fourthly； it
would be perfect when we had attained to the idea of the absolutely
perfect Being。 （5） This is an observation which should be made at the
outset； in order that we may arrive at the knowledge of such a being more
quickly。
＇50＇ （1） Let us then make a beginning with the first part of the method；
which is； as we have said； to distinguish and separate the true idea from
other perceptions； and to keep the mind from confusing with true ideas
those which are false； fictitious； and doubtful。 （2） I intend to dwell on
this point at length； partly to keep a distinction so necessary before the
reader's mind； and also because there are some who doubt of true ideas；
through not having attended to the distinction between a true perception
and all others。 （3） Such persons are like men who； while they are awake；
doubt not that they are awake； but afterwards in a dream； as often happens；
thinking that they are surely awake； and then finding that they were in
error； become doubtful even of being awake。 （4） This state of mind
arises through neglect of the distinction between sleeping and waking。
＇51＇ （1） Meanwhile； I give warning that I shall not here give
essence of every perception； and explain it through its proximate cause。
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（2） Such work lies in the province of philosophy。 （3） I shall confine
myself to what concerns method … that is； to the character of fictitious；
false and doubtful perceptions； and the means of freeing ourselves
therefrom。 （4） Let us then first inquire into the nature of a fictitious idea。
＇52＇ （1） Every perception has for its object either a thing considered
as existing； or solely the essence of a thing。 （2） Now 〃fiction〃 is chiefly
occupied with things considered as existing。 （3） I will； therefore；
consider these first … I mean cases where only the existence of an object is
feigned； and the thing thus feigned is understood； or assumed to be
understood。 （4） For instance； I feign that Peter； whom I know to have
gone home； is gone to see me； ＇r＇ or something of that kind。 （5） With
what is such an idea concerned？ （6） It is concerned with things possible；
and not with things necessary or impossible。
＇53＇ （1） I call a thing impossible when its existence would imply a
contradiction； necessary； when its non…existence would imply a
contradiction； possible； when neither its existence nor its non…existence
imply a contradiction； but when the necessity or impossibility of its nature
depends on causes unknown to us； while we feign that it exists。 （2） If the
necessity or impossibility of its existence depending on external causes
were known to us； we could not form any fictitious hypotheses about it；
＇54＇ （1） Whence it follows that if there be a God； or omniscient Being；
such an one cannot form fictitious hypotheses。 （2） For； as regards
ourselves； when I know that I exist； ＇s＇ I cannot hypothesize that I exist or
do not exist； any more than I can hypothesize an elephant that can go
through the eye of a needle； nor when I know the nature of God； can I
hypothesize that He or does not exist。 ＇t＇ （54：3） The same thing must
be said of the Chimaera； whereof the nature implies a contradiction。 （4）
From these considerations； it is plain； as I have already stated； that fiction
cannot be concerned with eternal truths。 ＇u＇
＇55＇ （1） But before proceeding further； I must remark； in passing；
that the difference between the essence of one thing and the essence of
another thing is the same as that which exists between the reality or
existence of one thing and the reality or existence of another； therefore； if
we wished to conceive the existence； for example； of Adam； simply by
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means of existence in general； it would be the same as if； in order to
conceive his existence； we went back to the nature of being； so as to define
Adam as a being。 （2） Thus； the more existence is conceived generally；
the more is it conceived confusedly and the more easily can it be ascribed
to a given object。 （55：3） Contrariwise； the more it is conceived particularly；
the more is it understood clearly； and the less liable is it to be ascribed；
through negligence of Nature's order； to anything save its proper object。
（4） This is worthy of remark。
＇56＇ （1） We now proceed to consider those cases which are
commonly called fictions； though we clearly understood that the thing is
not as we imagine it。 （2） For instance； I know that the earth is round； but
nothing prevents my tellin
